The Future?
| Some What ifs of Democratic Repulicanism I am not qualified to predict the future, nor am I inclined to want to try. As we all know, there are two many variables, the first and most of important of which is the irrationality of man. But many others, if not so inclined (to predict the future) are willing to offer qualified options, that, just as computer programs are written (if-then-else) would lead to alternate solutions. This page will address some of the qualifications - and possible solutions they offer - incorporating (as usual) many collected quotations, in addition (also of course) interspersed with my observations. |
Philosophical Basis
The polar differences in mankind's views of himself and his situation have basically
been between state versus individual, good versus evil, rights, freedom and the extent to
which the good of the many should prevail. Superimposed on this - naturally - are the
differences among people, including ability, motivation and cooperation - or lack of.
Simply stated - in my view - those who can prefer to be left alone to do, and those who
can't prefer to be given help, with the same vast plethora of shades of gray in between.
And since in the balance there are more people who could do with help than there are
who can take care of themselves, thank you, the future direction of democratic
republicanism is fairly obvious, particularly when the growing complication of
interrelationships and interdependence is factored in; in short it is bigger government.
History tells us several things (and I am making these up as i go along):
The polar differences in mankind's views of himself and his situation have basically
been between state versus individual, good versus evil, rights, freedom and the extent to
which the good of the many should prevail. Superimposed on this - naturally - are the
differences among people, including ability, motivation and cooperation - or lack of.
Simply stated - in my view - those who can prefer to be left alone to do, and those who
can't prefer to be given help, with the same vast plethora of shades of gray in between.
And since in the balance there are more people who could do with help than there are
who can take care of themselves, thank you, the future direction of democratic
republicanism is fairly obvious, particularly when the growing complication of
interrelationships and interdependence is factored in; in short it is bigger government.
History tells us several things (and I am making these up as i go along):
- Given their freedom to do so, some people will do better than others, for any
number of reasons.
With that freedom - or given the constraints that imposes - people will make
greater efforts to do what they want to do, and that for which they are rewarded.
Given the choices available to them, some will willingly trade challenge for
security.
- Most of us do not like to see our fellows suffer, but resent it when they take
advantage.
- Taking advantage takes several forms, some stemming from indolence, some
through violence, and much in between.
- In the world we live in some will rule and some will be content to be ruled; there
are a number of ways that relationship can be worked out, though almost always
based on some form of superiority differential.
- Once that leadership advantage has been established, many of those who can,
because of it, will take advantage of their position to take advantage of it.
- Similarly many of those who do not have that advantage, and are willing and able
to, will also find ways to take advantage.
- The laws of man, however established and administered, are done so with the
intent to maintain order in lieu of the chaos that would otherwise exist.
- It is fairly likely that no matter what, a large number of people with be discontent
with their lot. Discontent and complaining about it are an international pastime.
Our governing institutions will be
dominated by this philosophical basis,
but will always be influenced by several
realities:
We are driven by envy.
dominated by this philosophical basis,
but will always be influenced by several
realities:
- Things always appear to be
worse than they are.
- The grass always appears
greener on the other side of the
fence.
- Emotion will almost always hold
more sway than rationality.
- The complexities that can exist in
our lives, such as economics for
example, will almost always be
misunderstood.
- All else being equal we prefer
entertainment to most else,
something we are all likely to
pursue somewhat differently.
- We have a competitive bent,
meaning that many (most?) want
to feel superior to others,
however we may be able to
arrange that.
- We will be influenced by
propaganda, though not always
the same propaganda, or in the
same way.
We prefer things to be as we
want them to be, rather than as
they are.
We are driven by envy.
Some of the quotations below will have appeared elsewhere in these increasingly chaotic
pages, but should be oriented more to prediction of the future than they were elsewhere.
pages, but should be oriented more to prediction of the future than they were elsewhere.
The Next 100 Years by George Friedman (STRATFOR)
"Geopolitics and economics both assume that the players are
rational, at least in the sense of knowing their own short-term
self-interest. As rational actors, reality provides them with limited
choices. It is assumed that, on the whole people and nations will
pursue their self-interest, if not flawlessly, then at least not randomly...
Geopolitics does not take the individual leader very seriously, any
more than economics take s the individual businessman too
seriously. Both are players who know how to manage a process but
are not free to break the very rigid rules of their professions.
Politicians are therefore rarely free actors. Their actions are
determined by circumstances, and public policy is a response to
reality...
Geopolitics assumes that humans organize themselves into units
larger than families, and that by doing this they must engage in
politics; that the character of a nation is determined to a great extent
by geography, as is the relationship between nations...
The twenty-first century will be like all other centuries. There will be
wars, there will be poverty, there will be triumphs and defeats...
The US-Islamist war is already ending and the next conflict is in
sight...
The Russians can't avoid trying to reassert power, and the United
States can't avoid trying to resist. But in the end Russia can't win. Its
deep internal problems, massively declining population, and poor
infrastructure ultimately make Russia's long-term survival prospects
bleak...
China is inherently unstable. Whenever it opens its borders to the
outside world, the coastal region becomes prosperous, but the vast
majority of Chinese in the interior remain impoverished. This leads to
tension, conflict, and instability...
But Turkey is a stable platform in the midst of chaos. As Turkey's
power grows - and its economy and military are already the most
powerful in the region - so will Turkish influence...
Poland will become the leading power in a coalition of states facing
the Russians...
But underlying all of this will be the single most important fact of the
twenty-first century: the end of the population explosion...What will be
the most immediate result of a shrinking world population? Quite
simply, in the first half of the century, the population bust will create a
major labor shortage in advanced industrial countries...
These changes will lead to the final crisis of the twenty-first
century...During the great migration north encouraged by the United
States, the population balance in the old Mexican Cession will shift
dramatically until much of the region is predominantly Mexican...
In looking back at the twentieth century, there were things we could be
certain of, things that were likely, and things that were unknown. We
could be certain that nation-states would continue to be the way in
which humans organized in the world. We could know that wars
would become more deadly...Knowing that wars were inevitable and
that they would grow worse, it did not take a great leap to imagine
who would fight whom...
That is what I have tried to do in this book - to sense the twenty-first
century with geopolitics as my primary guide. I began with the
permanent: the persistence of the human condition, suspended
between heaven and hell. I then looked for the long-term trend, which
I found in the decline and fall of Europe as the centerpiece of global
civilization and its replacement by North America and the dominant
North American power, the United States. With that profound shift of
the international system, it was easy to discern both the character of
the United States - headstrong, immature, and brilliant - and the
world's response to it: fear, envy and resistance."
"Geopolitics and economics both assume that the players are
rational, at least in the sense of knowing their own short-term
self-interest. As rational actors, reality provides them with limited
choices. It is assumed that, on the whole people and nations will
pursue their self-interest, if not flawlessly, then at least not randomly...
Geopolitics does not take the individual leader very seriously, any
more than economics take s the individual businessman too
seriously. Both are players who know how to manage a process but
are not free to break the very rigid rules of their professions.
Politicians are therefore rarely free actors. Their actions are
determined by circumstances, and public policy is a response to
reality...
Geopolitics assumes that humans organize themselves into units
larger than families, and that by doing this they must engage in
politics; that the character of a nation is determined to a great extent
by geography, as is the relationship between nations...
The twenty-first century will be like all other centuries. There will be
wars, there will be poverty, there will be triumphs and defeats...
The US-Islamist war is already ending and the next conflict is in
sight...
The Russians can't avoid trying to reassert power, and the United
States can't avoid trying to resist. But in the end Russia can't win. Its
deep internal problems, massively declining population, and poor
infrastructure ultimately make Russia's long-term survival prospects
bleak...
China is inherently unstable. Whenever it opens its borders to the
outside world, the coastal region becomes prosperous, but the vast
majority of Chinese in the interior remain impoverished. This leads to
tension, conflict, and instability...
But Turkey is a stable platform in the midst of chaos. As Turkey's
power grows - and its economy and military are already the most
powerful in the region - so will Turkish influence...
Poland will become the leading power in a coalition of states facing
the Russians...
But underlying all of this will be the single most important fact of the
twenty-first century: the end of the population explosion...What will be
the most immediate result of a shrinking world population? Quite
simply, in the first half of the century, the population bust will create a
major labor shortage in advanced industrial countries...
These changes will lead to the final crisis of the twenty-first
century...During the great migration north encouraged by the United
States, the population balance in the old Mexican Cession will shift
dramatically until much of the region is predominantly Mexican...
In looking back at the twentieth century, there were things we could be
certain of, things that were likely, and things that were unknown. We
could be certain that nation-states would continue to be the way in
which humans organized in the world. We could know that wars
would become more deadly...Knowing that wars were inevitable and
that they would grow worse, it did not take a great leap to imagine
who would fight whom...
That is what I have tried to do in this book - to sense the twenty-first
century with geopolitics as my primary guide. I began with the
permanent: the persistence of the human condition, suspended
between heaven and hell. I then looked for the long-term trend, which
I found in the decline and fall of Europe as the centerpiece of global
civilization and its replacement by North America and the dominant
North American power, the United States. With that profound shift of
the international system, it was easy to discern both the character of
the United States - headstrong, immature, and brilliant - and the
world's response to it: fear, envy and resistance."
Who Are We? by Samuel P. Huntington
"Significant elements of American elites are favorably
disposed to America becoming a cosmopolitan society.
Other elites wish it to assume an imperial role. The
overwhelming bulk of the American people are committed
to a national alternative and to preserving and
strengthening the American identity that has existed for
centuries. America becomes the world. The world
becomes America. America remains America.
Cosmopolitan? Imperial? National? The choices
Americans make will shape their future as a nation and
the future of the world."
"Significant elements of American elites are favorably
disposed to America becoming a cosmopolitan society.
Other elites wish it to assume an imperial role. The
overwhelming bulk of the American people are committed
to a national alternative and to preserving and
strengthening the American identity that has existed for
centuries. America becomes the world. The world
becomes America. America remains America.
Cosmopolitan? Imperial? National? The choices
Americans make will shape their future as a nation and
the future of the world."
Real Education by Charles Murray
"The proposition is not that America's future should depend on
an elite that is educated to run the country, but that, whether we
like it or not, America's future does depend on an elite that runs
the country...For practical purposes, the nation is run by an elite
that we do not choose...
It is time to recognize that even the best schools under the best
conditions cannot overcome the limits on achievement set by
limits on academic ability. This is not a counsel of despair.
The implication is not to stop trying to help, but to stop doing
harm. Educational romanticism has imposed immeasurable
costs on children and their futures. It pursues unattainable
egalitarian ideals of educational achievement (e.g., all children
should perform at grade level) at the expense of attainable
egalitarian ideals of personal dignity. We can do much better
for children who are below average in academic ability, but only
after we get a grip on reality...
All of them (public school systems) are too politically sensitive
for one reason or another. It is therefore inevitable that
improvements in K-12 education will track with the success of
the advocates of school choice. This is not a statement of my
policy preference but of political reality...
Getting the school under the control of the adults requires
relentless enforcement of a few basic rules:
(temporary or not) is part of the price to be paid for safe and
orderly schools...
If there is to be a return to reality, it will not come from
government. Of all the people hooked on wishful thinking,
politicians have the most untreatable habit. A return to reality
will happen through the decisions of parents who can make
choices about the schooling of their children, and eventually,
through the recognition that all parents should be able to make
such choices...
The Four Major Truths:
"The proposition is not that America's future should depend on
an elite that is educated to run the country, but that, whether we
like it or not, America's future does depend on an elite that runs
the country...For practical purposes, the nation is run by an elite
that we do not choose...
It is time to recognize that even the best schools under the best
conditions cannot overcome the limits on achievement set by
limits on academic ability. This is not a counsel of despair.
The implication is not to stop trying to help, but to stop doing
harm. Educational romanticism has imposed immeasurable
costs on children and their futures. It pursues unattainable
egalitarian ideals of educational achievement (e.g., all children
should perform at grade level) at the expense of attainable
egalitarian ideals of personal dignity. We can do much better
for children who are below average in academic ability, but only
after we get a grip on reality...
All of them (public school systems) are too politically sensitive
for one reason or another. It is therefore inevitable that
improvements in K-12 education will track with the success of
the advocates of school choice. This is not a statement of my
policy preference but of political reality...
Getting the school under the control of the adults requires
relentless enforcement of a few basic rules:
- Disruptive students are not permitted to remain in class.
Students who are chronically disruptive are suspended.
Students who in any way threaten a teacher verbally or
physically are expelled.
(temporary or not) is part of the price to be paid for safe and
orderly schools...
If there is to be a return to reality, it will not come from
government. Of all the people hooked on wishful thinking,
politicians have the most untreatable habit. A return to reality
will happen through the decisions of parents who can make
choices about the schooling of their children, and eventually,
through the recognition that all parents should be able to make
such choices...
The Four Major Truths:
- Ability varies
Too many people are going to college
Half of the children are below average
America's future depends on how
we educate the academically gifted."
The Coming Anarchy by Robert D. Kaplan
"The real message here (Russian democracy) is not the
failure of democracy - but the emergence of
quasi-democratic 'hybrid' regimes, where parliamentary
practices are officially adhered to, while behind the scenes
the military and security services play dominant roles.
Venezuela seems to be the latest example of this trend...(I
am seeking) to grapple with how the world actually works,
rather than to describe a better world that may never be."
"(Martin van Cleveld): 'Once the legal monopoly of armed
force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands,
existing distinctions between war and crime will break down
much as is already the case today in...Lebanon, Sri Lanka,
El Salvador, Peru, Columbia.'"
"One must add...factors such as migrations of populations,
explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward
the map of the world will never be static. This future map -
in a sense, the 'last map' - will be an ever-mutating
representation of chaos."
"Indeed, those who quote Alex de Tocqueville in support of
democracy's inevitability should pay heed to his observation
that Americans, because their (comparative) equality,
exaggerate 'the scope of human perfectibility'...To
Thucydides, the very security and satisfactory life that the
Athenians enjoyed under Pericles blinded them to the bleak
forces of human nature that were gradually to be their
undoing."
"Social stability results from the establishment of a middle
class. Not democracy but authoritarian systems, including
monarchies, create middle classes - which, having
achieved a certain size and self-confidence, revolt against
the very dictators who generated prosperity."
"Though the swing toward democracy following the Cold
War was a triumph for liberal philosophy, the pendulum will
come to est where it belongs - in the middle, between the
ideals of Berlin and the realities of Hobbes. Where a
political system leans to far in either direction, realignment
or disaster awaits...Anarchy and tyranny, of course, are
closely related: because power abhors a vacuum, the one
necessarily leads to the other."
"Jeffrey Sachs, a professor of international trade at Harvard,
writes that 'good government' means relative safety from
corruption, from breach of contract, from property
exploitation, and from bureaucratic inefficiency."
"Corporations are like the feudal domains that evolved into
nation-states; they are nothing less than the vanguard of a
new Darwinian organization of politics."
"To categorize accurately the political system of a given
society, one must define the significant elements of power
within it."
"Aristophanes and Euripides, the late-eighteenth-century
Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson, and Tocqueville in
the nineteenth century (as well as Helmuth von Moltke the
elder) all warned that material prosperity would breed
servility and withdrawal, turning people into, in Tocqueville's
words, 'industrious sheep'."
"The last thing America needs is more voters - particularly
badly educated and alienated ones - with a passion for
politics...willingess to give up self and responsibility is the
sine qua non for tyranny."
"War...trouble awaits us, if only because the 'triumph' of
democracy in the developing world will cause great
upheavals before many places settle into more practical -
and, it is to be hoped, benign - hybrid regimes."
"According to Aristotle, 'whether the few or the many rule is
accidental to oligarchy and democracy - the rich are few
everywhere, the poor many.' The real difference, he wrote, is
that 'oligarchy is to the advantage of the rich, democracy to
the advantage of the poor.'"
"As the size of the U.S. population and the complexity of
American life spill beyond the traditional national
community, creating a new world of city-states and suburbs,
the distance will grow between the citizens of the new
city-states and the bureaucratic class of overseers in
Washington. Those overseers will manage an elite
volunteer military armed with information-age weapons, in a
world made chaotic by the spread of democracy and its
attendant neo-authoritarian heresies...Liberty, after all, is
inseparable from authority, as Henry Kissinger observed in
A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the
Problems of Peace 1812-1822 (1957). A hybrid regime may
await us all. The future of the Third World may finally be our
own."
"Alas, protection against evil is surest when man is
assumed to be wholly unimprovable...The Cold War is over,
but dealing with bad people will always be necessary to
prevent even greater evil...The Decline and Fall instructs that
human nature never changes."
"The real message here (Russian democracy) is not the
failure of democracy - but the emergence of
quasi-democratic 'hybrid' regimes, where parliamentary
practices are officially adhered to, while behind the scenes
the military and security services play dominant roles.
Venezuela seems to be the latest example of this trend...(I
am seeking) to grapple with how the world actually works,
rather than to describe a better world that may never be."
"(Martin van Cleveld): 'Once the legal monopoly of armed
force, long claimed by the state, is wrested out of its hands,
existing distinctions between war and crime will break down
much as is already the case today in...Lebanon, Sri Lanka,
El Salvador, Peru, Columbia.'"
"One must add...factors such as migrations of populations,
explosions of birth rates, vectors of disease. Henceforward
the map of the world will never be static. This future map -
in a sense, the 'last map' - will be an ever-mutating
representation of chaos."
"Indeed, those who quote Alex de Tocqueville in support of
democracy's inevitability should pay heed to his observation
that Americans, because their (comparative) equality,
exaggerate 'the scope of human perfectibility'...To
Thucydides, the very security and satisfactory life that the
Athenians enjoyed under Pericles blinded them to the bleak
forces of human nature that were gradually to be their
undoing."
"Social stability results from the establishment of a middle
class. Not democracy but authoritarian systems, including
monarchies, create middle classes - which, having
achieved a certain size and self-confidence, revolt against
the very dictators who generated prosperity."
"Though the swing toward democracy following the Cold
War was a triumph for liberal philosophy, the pendulum will
come to est where it belongs - in the middle, between the
ideals of Berlin and the realities of Hobbes. Where a
political system leans to far in either direction, realignment
or disaster awaits...Anarchy and tyranny, of course, are
closely related: because power abhors a vacuum, the one
necessarily leads to the other."
"Jeffrey Sachs, a professor of international trade at Harvard,
writes that 'good government' means relative safety from
corruption, from breach of contract, from property
exploitation, and from bureaucratic inefficiency."
"Corporations are like the feudal domains that evolved into
nation-states; they are nothing less than the vanguard of a
new Darwinian organization of politics."
"To categorize accurately the political system of a given
society, one must define the significant elements of power
within it."
"Aristophanes and Euripides, the late-eighteenth-century
Scottish philosopher Adam Ferguson, and Tocqueville in
the nineteenth century (as well as Helmuth von Moltke the
elder) all warned that material prosperity would breed
servility and withdrawal, turning people into, in Tocqueville's
words, 'industrious sheep'."
"The last thing America needs is more voters - particularly
badly educated and alienated ones - with a passion for
politics...willingess to give up self and responsibility is the
sine qua non for tyranny."
"War...trouble awaits us, if only because the 'triumph' of
democracy in the developing world will cause great
upheavals before many places settle into more practical -
and, it is to be hoped, benign - hybrid regimes."
"According to Aristotle, 'whether the few or the many rule is
accidental to oligarchy and democracy - the rich are few
everywhere, the poor many.' The real difference, he wrote, is
that 'oligarchy is to the advantage of the rich, democracy to
the advantage of the poor.'"
"As the size of the U.S. population and the complexity of
American life spill beyond the traditional national
community, creating a new world of city-states and suburbs,
the distance will grow between the citizens of the new
city-states and the bureaucratic class of overseers in
Washington. Those overseers will manage an elite
volunteer military armed with information-age weapons, in a
world made chaotic by the spread of democracy and its
attendant neo-authoritarian heresies...Liberty, after all, is
inseparable from authority, as Henry Kissinger observed in
A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the
Problems of Peace 1812-1822 (1957). A hybrid regime may
await us all. The future of the Third World may finally be our
own."
"Alas, protection against evil is surest when man is
assumed to be wholly unimprovable...The Cold War is over,
but dealing with bad people will always be necessary to
prevent even greater evil...The Decline and Fall instructs that
human nature never changes."
Kaplan continued:
"James Madison in The Federalist, too, was convinced that a state or an
empire can endure only if it generally limits itself to adjudicating disputes
among its peoples, and in so doing becomes an exemplar of patriotic
virtue."
"George F. Kennan: 'The fact is that this dreadful situation (Somalia)
cannot possibly be put to rights other than by the establishment of a
governing power for the entire territory, and a very ruthless, determined
one at that. It would not be a democratic one, because the very
pre-requisites for a democratic political system do not exist among the
people in question.'"
"The word revolution...(is) something that (Henry) Kissinger's experience
as a youth, augmented by scholarship, taught him to fear. Rapid social
and political transformation leads to violence...Disorder is worse than
injustice (obviously, great injustice is worse than a little
disorder...Kissinger suggested that nothing is more dangerous than
people convinced of their moral superiority...The dangers inherent in fast
social transformation are so great that demands for universal justice are
ill informed."
"All of them (foreign-policy realists of the time including Kennan,
Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morganthau} doubted that America, however
overreaching its power, would ever be able to affect the internal evolution
of many other societies at once: the world is too vast, and the expense
and stamina required are prohibitive, at least with regard to winning
public acceptance...because the resources of even a superpower are
limited, morality alone can never be a basis for foreign policy. These
men saw the missionary idealism of America's ruling elite as naive...our
much-vaunted foreign-policy idealism is mainly confined to the media
and academia, and particularly to the intellectual journals of opinion."
"Morganthau: ' The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That
reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the mind of the
observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself. What others
think about us is as important as what we actually are'...perceptions are
often everything in crises, and Nixon's and Kissinger's record in foreign
policy may have been more of a piece than we like to admit."
"Peaceful times are...superficial times, in which we concentrate on social
imperfections because the political order appears secure, and judge
Cabinet members not on how they perform fut on how they perform at
press conferences. Such times never last...peace , as a primary goal, is
dangerous because it implies that you will sacrifice any principle for the
sake of it.
"Avoiding tragedy requires a sense of it, which in turn requires a sense of
history...(with peace) with nothing of truly life-and-death importance at
stake, the media require less accountability . And because the media
increasingly lack both irony and a sense of the past, they concentrate on
public scandal, unaware that a system with little or no corruption would
likely be tyrannical...Corruption, infidelity, and stupidity in moderate doses
are, like occasional wars, evidence of humanity."
"A ...frightning prospect of peacetime is the reduction of standing
armies...One purpose of standing armies has been to canalize and
bureaucratically control the violent element of the citizenry, and steer it
toward a useful end. Therefore a reduced standing army will likely result
in an increase in gang activity and other forms of violent behavior...With
our standing army set to diminish further...there are likely to be more
frustrated, action-prone, young males in America with no acceptable
outlet for their inclinations. So the idea that a world at peace will mean
less violence is naive...
"James Madison in The Federalist, too, was convinced that a state or an
empire can endure only if it generally limits itself to adjudicating disputes
among its peoples, and in so doing becomes an exemplar of patriotic
virtue."
"George F. Kennan: 'The fact is that this dreadful situation (Somalia)
cannot possibly be put to rights other than by the establishment of a
governing power for the entire territory, and a very ruthless, determined
one at that. It would not be a democratic one, because the very
pre-requisites for a democratic political system do not exist among the
people in question.'"
"The word revolution...(is) something that (Henry) Kissinger's experience
as a youth, augmented by scholarship, taught him to fear. Rapid social
and political transformation leads to violence...Disorder is worse than
injustice (obviously, great injustice is worse than a little
disorder...Kissinger suggested that nothing is more dangerous than
people convinced of their moral superiority...The dangers inherent in fast
social transformation are so great that demands for universal justice are
ill informed."
"All of them (foreign-policy realists of the time including Kennan,
Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morganthau} doubted that America, however
overreaching its power, would ever be able to affect the internal evolution
of many other societies at once: the world is too vast, and the expense
and stamina required are prohibitive, at least with regard to winning
public acceptance...because the resources of even a superpower are
limited, morality alone can never be a basis for foreign policy. These
men saw the missionary idealism of America's ruling elite as naive...our
much-vaunted foreign-policy idealism is mainly confined to the media
and academia, and particularly to the intellectual journals of opinion."
"Morganthau: ' The prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That
reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the mind of the
observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself. What others
think about us is as important as what we actually are'...perceptions are
often everything in crises, and Nixon's and Kissinger's record in foreign
policy may have been more of a piece than we like to admit."
"Peaceful times are...superficial times, in which we concentrate on social
imperfections because the political order appears secure, and judge
Cabinet members not on how they perform fut on how they perform at
press conferences. Such times never last...peace , as a primary goal, is
dangerous because it implies that you will sacrifice any principle for the
sake of it.
"Avoiding tragedy requires a sense of it, which in turn requires a sense of
history...(with peace) with nothing of truly life-and-death importance at
stake, the media require less accountability . And because the media
increasingly lack both irony and a sense of the past, they concentrate on
public scandal, unaware that a system with little or no corruption would
likely be tyrannical...Corruption, infidelity, and stupidity in moderate doses
are, like occasional wars, evidence of humanity."
"A ...frightning prospect of peacetime is the reduction of standing
armies...One purpose of standing armies has been to canalize and
bureaucratically control the violent element of the citizenry, and steer it
toward a useful end. Therefore a reduced standing army will likely result
in an increase in gang activity and other forms of violent behavior...With
our standing army set to diminish further...there are likely to be more
frustrated, action-prone, young males in America with no acceptable
outlet for their inclinations. So the idea that a world at peace will mean
less violence is naive...
Kaplan has spent much of his time as a
foreign correspondent, having lived with the
violence of revolution; thus he sees life
differently than many of us; I would suggest
more realistically than most. This book and
others by him express this reality, as he sees
it.
It was published in the year 2000.
I would suggest that in light of the current
drift of our government and its fiscal and
foreign policies that thought be given to his
words, despite that many would prefer to not
do so.
I have said elsewhere that we are drifting
into a world of fantasy. Kaplan, I think, says
similarly, but in a different way.
foreign correspondent, having lived with the
violence of revolution; thus he sees life
differently than many of us; I would suggest
more realistically than most. This book and
others by him express this reality, as he sees
it.
It was published in the year 2000.
I would suggest that in light of the current
drift of our government and its fiscal and
foreign policies that thought be given to his
words, despite that many would prefer to not
do so.
I have said elsewhere that we are drifting
into a world of fantasy. Kaplan, I think, says
similarly, but in a different way.
Questioning Middle Ground
I believe that the historical fate of this county has been closely bound to compromise, as I have said many times; that
compromise has never been easy and once resulted in a bloody civil war. I have taken the position on this website that I
wish to defend the embattled middle ground that is defined by compromise. Is it still possible?
Well, I am being forced to question the position – at least the reality of it. Having spent some time recently working on
attempting to explain the competing opinions on issues, I am finding it increasingly difficult to do. Bryon Caplan, in his
book, The Myth of the Rational Voter, offers some reasons why. The problem, he says, is not rational ignorance, but
rational irrationality, that is, it’s not ignorance of facts that lead to position formulation, but the shaping of that formulation
by emotional preconception. It is not a simple concept, and I am wrestling with its understanding, partly due to my own
preconceptions; partly because I have difficulty giving up the belief in wide spread ignorance.
Some specific Caplan comments include, “the only obstacle to maximum social welfare is false beliefs about what
policies work best,” and “people who lack the initiative or creativity to reach misconceptions under their own steam can
relax and let the media tow them there.” Ignorance or irrationality? They do blur together, I think, because some
ignorance, tinged with emotional preconceptions, makes irrationality possible, so finding Middle Ground faces strong
resistance due to the combination of the two. Caplan goes on to define four feeding biases that shape what voters
think: anti-market bias, anti-foreign bias, make-work bias and pessimistic bias. I have discussed these in more detail
elsewhere on this page, so I won’t again here, but it got me to thinking about his challenge: most people are neither
willing nor able to give up on their biases, despite facts offered to refute them.
So, what of Middle Ground? And more explicitly, what of democratic republicanism? It is easy to become cynical
about it, but how will it be affected? I think we are beginning to see increasing paternalism ( Patriarchy), and bigger
government. In a time of rural self-sufficiency it was one thing to say let them fall back on their own resources and they
are best left alone; that is the basis of the Constitution: minimal government and checks on and balances of too much
centralized power. But when 75% of the population live in a suburban environment such self-sufficiency is less realistic.
On the other hand we have seen the ravages of both socialism (government ownership of the means of production)
and despotism (of many forms); reasonable governing is beyond the ability of bureaucrats under both extremes. So
since we will always be controlled by an elite, the question is how that elite will be chosen and that, I believe, is the
Middle Ground over which we are destined to compete, defined by some form of republicanism - however contrived or
manipulated. If we can narrow the battle field to that, there is hope that the pendulum swings will not be so great that
they must take us to the extremes, and will therefore not lead to catastrophic results, unless the situation becomes dire.
The Middle Ground then becomes a range of options rather than more narrowly defined agreed upon policy. Pierre
Manent: “a representative republic replaces direct democracy, making it possible to filter the wills and passions of the
people.” John Dunn: “had it really been rule by the people…it would assuredly not have triumphed, but dissolved
instead, immediately and irreversibly, into chaos.” John Dunn again, paraphrasing Madison in Federalist Number 10:
“Faction cannot be eliminated except by eliminating liberty itself. Its latent causes are ‘sown in the nature of man’.”
I find myself continually returning to the same references that more and more shape my arguments with myself. Can
democratic republicanism survive as currently constituted? Constitutions are neither identical nor, in many instances,
even consistent. Some work better than others; some fall apart, but then reconstitute themselves in some form or
other. I believe that the day of dictatorial rule is no longer possible – for long – as the aristocracies of the late Middle
Ages found to their dismay. Will despotism disappear? No, when the pendulum swings beyond the Middle Ground it
will rear its ugly head, but not for long because its nature is such that it will inevitably lead to collapse and violence –
public opinion has become too powerful.
I began considering it perhaps impossible to defend Middle Ground as I was viewing it, but convinced myself once
again with the benefit of my references, that some form of it will be the wave of the future because of the power of public
opinion. What form? That will be the crucial – and undulating – question, for a Middle Ground range of options
including perhaps, (as described by Robert D. Kaplan) anarchy, reflecting basically republican tenets - some more
authoritarian than others, some more tribal than others, some even more democratic than others. That, however, may
be more complicated than I have stated it. The "republics" of much of the world will look much different from those of the
West; they will reflect much different cultures; and perhaps the trappings will be more facade than true republican
structure - but it will at least provide basis for Middle Ground discourse.
Professor Tytler talked about the limited life span of empires, and many are looking to the demise of the American
empire – to become what? They don’t say; they don’t know. But then we are humans, with very limited life spans of our
own, and that we think in terms of the length of our life-times, more or less, is natural. That would suggest that when the
extremes are probed they will eventually return to the steady state, which has become some form of republicanism,
replacing the despotism of the past, which is no longer sustainable for any period of time; what period of time? Maybe
longer than is comfortable, but whereas the steady state used to be tyranny I believe it has become republicanism – of
some sort.
The flexibility of that Middle Ground will be crucial, and to maintain it the goal will have to be keeping it within a range
that is sustainable despite strains that are inevitable. Ultimately that Middle Ground must contain respect for property,
human rights, rule of law, reasonably free markets and sovereignty of the people as represented by their chosen elite
representatives. But each of those is subject to ranges of their own. How much rights? How free markets? What
laws? The nature of the bureaucratic elite (ability, dedication, honesty, etc.) and the degree of government control. The
Middle Ground range will include a rather interesting diversity of controls by the government, particularly executive
branches, and still remain (at least nominally) within the republican range - it already does.
Lest I leave the impression that the defense will be benign let me set it straight: it will be anything but. Violence and
struggle are the nature and legacy of man; without it we cannot exist. Caplan makes another interesting observation:
“economists emphasize the ‘long run’; the public cares about here and now.” Since everything is politics (Rousseau),
and all politics is economics, I think the economic parallel is applicable. Middle Ground is not a place in time, but a
journey over time that must be sustained within limits. That, I believe, is possible – and perhaps inevitable – but not
without a great deal of pain.
Part of that pain will come from differences in the shapes republicanism takes. Today, for example, Russia and other
former Eastern Bloc countries, in different ways, are shaping themselves in drastically different ways, based on the
nature of their cultures and how they came to republicanism. Russia conducts elections and sports the trappings of a
republic, but a very oligarchic and centrally controlled republic; in other words, very Russian. Many questions arise: what
roll will giant international corporations play? How will international crime factor? What roll will corruption play? Can
world institutions such as the United Nations play an effective roll? How will republican governments deal with resource
competition? The fact is that, despite republican institutions and elections, different republics will look and function
differently and go through phases that are not synchronous; how will each deal with this on the international stage?
And there is the challenge of the defense of Middle Ground: to keep pain tolerable without breaking the mold,
particularly when it is realized that there will likely never be a single world Middle Ground, but many competing and
continually changing Middle Grounds, all different and all striving for self-preservation and dominance. How could that
ever be peaceful? But can it be kept within limits? Perhaps it can, but with great difficulty. Rational irrationality within
voting blocs will not help; ignorance and differences in levels of ignorance will complicate it unimaginably, particularly
when one nation’s dogma is another nation’s ignorance; truth and reality, morality and sincerity, even the basis of laws
vary from one to another; and if compromise is difficult within a republic consider how much more so between and
among republics. Imperfect though it is, the United Nations has given us an example of how difficult the challenge.
Middle Ground, individually within countries or collectively among countries, will not be achieved by naively discounting
human nature (a hated term among social scientists), culture and national realities, or pretending that all that is needed
is to want peace. Most nations prefer peace, but on their own terms and in line with their own needs. Nor can it be
wished into existence. Middle Ground in the future, as in the past, will be the result of hard work by diplomats and
leaders dedicated to the concept. The structure – in most nations and certainly not across nations does not yet exist nor
will it ever by viewing it through a prism of fantasy. Nor, as has been alleged by some, can the “wisdom of the masses”
provide a viable solution. But in ways similar to those of free markets, the collective self-interests of people within
countries and across the world can work to dampen violence and aggression, and at least keep it within limits – The
Middle Ground – and if they have the capability to select and reject the elites that lead them, however imperfectly they
effect those choices.
Call it the invisible hand of international politics – or the hand of God, if that works better. But we must understand that
in a world of limited resources that has proven itself inconsistent at best; populated by people with varying degrees of
ignorance, hate and beliefs; and guided by leaders who too often are blinded by thirst for power and chosen frequently
for the wrong reasons, the result will never be perfect nor without serious differences in specific motivations and
expectations. Middle Ground is not a place, but a journey – a very arduous and frustrating journey. But it is still worth
defending, because that is our only chance of even moderate success.
I believe that the historical fate of this county has been closely bound to compromise, as I have said many times; that
compromise has never been easy and once resulted in a bloody civil war. I have taken the position on this website that I
wish to defend the embattled middle ground that is defined by compromise. Is it still possible?
Well, I am being forced to question the position – at least the reality of it. Having spent some time recently working on
attempting to explain the competing opinions on issues, I am finding it increasingly difficult to do. Bryon Caplan, in his
book, The Myth of the Rational Voter, offers some reasons why. The problem, he says, is not rational ignorance, but
rational irrationality, that is, it’s not ignorance of facts that lead to position formulation, but the shaping of that formulation
by emotional preconception. It is not a simple concept, and I am wrestling with its understanding, partly due to my own
preconceptions; partly because I have difficulty giving up the belief in wide spread ignorance.
Some specific Caplan comments include, “the only obstacle to maximum social welfare is false beliefs about what
policies work best,” and “people who lack the initiative or creativity to reach misconceptions under their own steam can
relax and let the media tow them there.” Ignorance or irrationality? They do blur together, I think, because some
ignorance, tinged with emotional preconceptions, makes irrationality possible, so finding Middle Ground faces strong
resistance due to the combination of the two. Caplan goes on to define four feeding biases that shape what voters
think: anti-market bias, anti-foreign bias, make-work bias and pessimistic bias. I have discussed these in more detail
elsewhere on this page, so I won’t again here, but it got me to thinking about his challenge: most people are neither
willing nor able to give up on their biases, despite facts offered to refute them.
So, what of Middle Ground? And more explicitly, what of democratic republicanism? It is easy to become cynical
about it, but how will it be affected? I think we are beginning to see increasing paternalism ( Patriarchy), and bigger
government. In a time of rural self-sufficiency it was one thing to say let them fall back on their own resources and they
are best left alone; that is the basis of the Constitution: minimal government and checks on and balances of too much
centralized power. But when 75% of the population live in a suburban environment such self-sufficiency is less realistic.
On the other hand we have seen the ravages of both socialism (government ownership of the means of production)
and despotism (of many forms); reasonable governing is beyond the ability of bureaucrats under both extremes. So
since we will always be controlled by an elite, the question is how that elite will be chosen and that, I believe, is the
Middle Ground over which we are destined to compete, defined by some form of republicanism - however contrived or
manipulated. If we can narrow the battle field to that, there is hope that the pendulum swings will not be so great that
they must take us to the extremes, and will therefore not lead to catastrophic results, unless the situation becomes dire.
The Middle Ground then becomes a range of options rather than more narrowly defined agreed upon policy. Pierre
Manent: “a representative republic replaces direct democracy, making it possible to filter the wills and passions of the
people.” John Dunn: “had it really been rule by the people…it would assuredly not have triumphed, but dissolved
instead, immediately and irreversibly, into chaos.” John Dunn again, paraphrasing Madison in Federalist Number 10:
“Faction cannot be eliminated except by eliminating liberty itself. Its latent causes are ‘sown in the nature of man’.”
I find myself continually returning to the same references that more and more shape my arguments with myself. Can
democratic republicanism survive as currently constituted? Constitutions are neither identical nor, in many instances,
even consistent. Some work better than others; some fall apart, but then reconstitute themselves in some form or
other. I believe that the day of dictatorial rule is no longer possible – for long – as the aristocracies of the late Middle
Ages found to their dismay. Will despotism disappear? No, when the pendulum swings beyond the Middle Ground it
will rear its ugly head, but not for long because its nature is such that it will inevitably lead to collapse and violence –
public opinion has become too powerful.
I began considering it perhaps impossible to defend Middle Ground as I was viewing it, but convinced myself once
again with the benefit of my references, that some form of it will be the wave of the future because of the power of public
opinion. What form? That will be the crucial – and undulating – question, for a Middle Ground range of options
including perhaps, (as described by Robert D. Kaplan) anarchy, reflecting basically republican tenets - some more
authoritarian than others, some more tribal than others, some even more democratic than others. That, however, may
be more complicated than I have stated it. The "republics" of much of the world will look much different from those of the
West; they will reflect much different cultures; and perhaps the trappings will be more facade than true republican
structure - but it will at least provide basis for Middle Ground discourse.
Professor Tytler talked about the limited life span of empires, and many are looking to the demise of the American
empire – to become what? They don’t say; they don’t know. But then we are humans, with very limited life spans of our
own, and that we think in terms of the length of our life-times, more or less, is natural. That would suggest that when the
extremes are probed they will eventually return to the steady state, which has become some form of republicanism,
replacing the despotism of the past, which is no longer sustainable for any period of time; what period of time? Maybe
longer than is comfortable, but whereas the steady state used to be tyranny I believe it has become republicanism – of
some sort.
The flexibility of that Middle Ground will be crucial, and to maintain it the goal will have to be keeping it within a range
that is sustainable despite strains that are inevitable. Ultimately that Middle Ground must contain respect for property,
human rights, rule of law, reasonably free markets and sovereignty of the people as represented by their chosen elite
representatives. But each of those is subject to ranges of their own. How much rights? How free markets? What
laws? The nature of the bureaucratic elite (ability, dedication, honesty, etc.) and the degree of government control. The
Middle Ground range will include a rather interesting diversity of controls by the government, particularly executive
branches, and still remain (at least nominally) within the republican range - it already does.
Lest I leave the impression that the defense will be benign let me set it straight: it will be anything but. Violence and
struggle are the nature and legacy of man; without it we cannot exist. Caplan makes another interesting observation:
“economists emphasize the ‘long run’; the public cares about here and now.” Since everything is politics (Rousseau),
and all politics is economics, I think the economic parallel is applicable. Middle Ground is not a place in time, but a
journey over time that must be sustained within limits. That, I believe, is possible – and perhaps inevitable – but not
without a great deal of pain.
Part of that pain will come from differences in the shapes republicanism takes. Today, for example, Russia and other
former Eastern Bloc countries, in different ways, are shaping themselves in drastically different ways, based on the
nature of their cultures and how they came to republicanism. Russia conducts elections and sports the trappings of a
republic, but a very oligarchic and centrally controlled republic; in other words, very Russian. Many questions arise: what
roll will giant international corporations play? How will international crime factor? What roll will corruption play? Can
world institutions such as the United Nations play an effective roll? How will republican governments deal with resource
competition? The fact is that, despite republican institutions and elections, different republics will look and function
differently and go through phases that are not synchronous; how will each deal with this on the international stage?
And there is the challenge of the defense of Middle Ground: to keep pain tolerable without breaking the mold,
particularly when it is realized that there will likely never be a single world Middle Ground, but many competing and
continually changing Middle Grounds, all different and all striving for self-preservation and dominance. How could that
ever be peaceful? But can it be kept within limits? Perhaps it can, but with great difficulty. Rational irrationality within
voting blocs will not help; ignorance and differences in levels of ignorance will complicate it unimaginably, particularly
when one nation’s dogma is another nation’s ignorance; truth and reality, morality and sincerity, even the basis of laws
vary from one to another; and if compromise is difficult within a republic consider how much more so between and
among republics. Imperfect though it is, the United Nations has given us an example of how difficult the challenge.
Middle Ground, individually within countries or collectively among countries, will not be achieved by naively discounting
human nature (a hated term among social scientists), culture and national realities, or pretending that all that is needed
is to want peace. Most nations prefer peace, but on their own terms and in line with their own needs. Nor can it be
wished into existence. Middle Ground in the future, as in the past, will be the result of hard work by diplomats and
leaders dedicated to the concept. The structure – in most nations and certainly not across nations does not yet exist nor
will it ever by viewing it through a prism of fantasy. Nor, as has been alleged by some, can the “wisdom of the masses”
provide a viable solution. But in ways similar to those of free markets, the collective self-interests of people within
countries and across the world can work to dampen violence and aggression, and at least keep it within limits – The
Middle Ground – and if they have the capability to select and reject the elites that lead them, however imperfectly they
effect those choices.
Call it the invisible hand of international politics – or the hand of God, if that works better. But we must understand that
in a world of limited resources that has proven itself inconsistent at best; populated by people with varying degrees of
ignorance, hate and beliefs; and guided by leaders who too often are blinded by thirst for power and chosen frequently
for the wrong reasons, the result will never be perfect nor without serious differences in specific motivations and
expectations. Middle Ground is not a place, but a journey – a very arduous and frustrating journey. But it is still worth
defending, because that is our only chance of even moderate success.
Some people like to believe that politics
is - or should be - a respectful discussion
society with an objective of reaching a
reasonable compromise agreement best for
the nation they represent; it's not.
Politics, regardless of form of
government, is brutal no holds barred fight
for power - always has been always will be.
That's the human way.
Corruption? Cheating? Lying?
Manipulating? Uh huh, but it's always the
other side that does it. But even if it were, the
voters accept it, as long as it benefits them.
Sure, he's a crook, but he's our crook.
Cynical? You bet. When one deals with
people and power he/she must be cynical. It
is the way things are.
is - or should be - a respectful discussion
society with an objective of reaching a
reasonable compromise agreement best for
the nation they represent; it's not.
Politics, regardless of form of
government, is brutal no holds barred fight
for power - always has been always will be.
That's the human way.
Corruption? Cheating? Lying?
Manipulating? Uh huh, but it's always the
other side that does it. But even if it were, the
voters accept it, as long as it benefits them.
Sure, he's a crook, but he's our crook.
Cynical? You bet. When one deals with
people and power he/she must be cynical. It
is the way things are.