Exploring Differences in Outlook
The Grass on the Other Side of the Fence
I was sent an article recently, written by a respected travel writer, that discussed the paternalistic government of
Denmark, including interviews with Danes. The gist was that they are quite happy, despite 50% taxes, because
essentially their needs are taken care of and their stress levels are low. The essence was that Danes are really
better off than Americans, and happier. I took note, and thought about it.
There is something to be said for a lower stressed, more secure (that is, taken care of) society; there is less
worry about things such as layoffs, health care and retirement because they are taken care of by the government.
Less opportunity perhaps, and more restrictions, but maybe it's worth it, particularly for those not overly driven by
ambition. They work less and have more time off. And since there is less conspicuous wealth, there is less
opportunity for envy. Life is simpler. At least that is what was suggested, and I am not prepared to say that it is
not true. I have read in several places lately, as I have written, that envy - keeping up with the Jones, and showing
off success - tends to be much stronger in the United States than in most places, perhaps because of the
individualistic culture we have spawned.
There is, however, another side to the matter, and a side that is much overlooked. It occurred to me that
perhaps some of the benefits that accrue to laid back Europe are due to the existence of the United States.
Could that be possible? International security is an obvious one; defense budgets are smaller in Europe than
they would otherwise be because of the super power umbrella of international defense. But then there is the
vast American market into which Danes can sell their products, as well as the products provided by America - all
those jazzy inventions (not only cars and airplanes, but Internet, electronics, movies, television programming -
and even fiscal products). How much hidden benefit does this provide to Danes?
There is also the matter of size. How much difference does that make? The populations of European countries,
particularly those like Denmark, are relatively small and so are distances within and among them. Size of
expectations are also likely smaller than in the United States and there is also the matter of homogeneity - or
was. Less contentiousness among groups with fewer major differences is significant, and without major
differences in policy driven by international responsibilities there is likely less to argue about. Or so it would
seem. There really are advantages to cultural homogeneity. That is changing in Europe, however, with the
massive immigration of Muslims from all over the world, particularly significant when one views the decreased
propagation rates of traditional Europeans. Not that that has any application to the United States, because our
diversity is fact and increasing and there is no possibility that will ever change.
I would suggest that there are some inherent problems with comparing European countries with the United
States - it's kind of like apples and oranges. But how much of our discontent (exhibited so forcefully by East
Coast intellectuals) is related to our desire to be more European? And why is this? The grass does always
appear greener on the other side of the fence, but sometimes is it? One should not automatically write off that
thinking with a close out argument. But think of how most Americans view Europe's green grass - as tourists.
Do we see only what we want to see, and overlook that which is not shoved in our faces? Comparison of the
tourist kind lacks the detail necessary to understand fully, and thus must remain inconclusive.
On the other hand there are definitely things we could learn from Europe, if we could, and we would. But many of
them are cultural, cultures are set deep, and our understandings of each others' are necessarily superficial at
best - even if we were more interested in developing them.
A final thought on the subject has to do with immigration - to the United States, emigration from Europe, but
other places as well. There continues to be very strong demand for it; why? The main reason is opportunity, or
perception of it. For those who are ambitious, the opportunity has always been greater in the United States.
Thomas Sowell wrote that 1% of those who can emigrate do, and those tend to be the most ambitious and most
adventuresome, which is, he suggested, part of what has built our unique personality. Is that good or bad? It
depends on the outlook, and might explain why Americans are as driven as they are; and perhaps also our
envious nature? But it also might explain the relative lack of it in other nations.
One cannot help but wonder about our apparent desire to change our culture, when cultures don't change easily.
But then perhaps immigration is influencing that too. Are our immigrants beginning to want to bring their
cultures with them to supplant ours rather than share ours? And in some cases could that be because of their
disappointment with the opportunity they assumed they would find and didn't? Or perhaps it has to do with the
longing for some of the paternal care they remember and miss from their previous homelands. And what will
they think when American culture changes to what they left? It could even be that changing American culture to
something like what they left behind could leave them with the worst of both worlds. We cannot know
beforehand, and afterwards it is too late.
I was sent an article recently, written by a respected travel writer, that discussed the paternalistic government of
Denmark, including interviews with Danes. The gist was that they are quite happy, despite 50% taxes, because
essentially their needs are taken care of and their stress levels are low. The essence was that Danes are really
better off than Americans, and happier. I took note, and thought about it.
There is something to be said for a lower stressed, more secure (that is, taken care of) society; there is less
worry about things such as layoffs, health care and retirement because they are taken care of by the government.
Less opportunity perhaps, and more restrictions, but maybe it's worth it, particularly for those not overly driven by
ambition. They work less and have more time off. And since there is less conspicuous wealth, there is less
opportunity for envy. Life is simpler. At least that is what was suggested, and I am not prepared to say that it is
not true. I have read in several places lately, as I have written, that envy - keeping up with the Jones, and showing
off success - tends to be much stronger in the United States than in most places, perhaps because of the
individualistic culture we have spawned.
There is, however, another side to the matter, and a side that is much overlooked. It occurred to me that
perhaps some of the benefits that accrue to laid back Europe are due to the existence of the United States.
Could that be possible? International security is an obvious one; defense budgets are smaller in Europe than
they would otherwise be because of the super power umbrella of international defense. But then there is the
vast American market into which Danes can sell their products, as well as the products provided by America - all
those jazzy inventions (not only cars and airplanes, but Internet, electronics, movies, television programming -
and even fiscal products). How much hidden benefit does this provide to Danes?
There is also the matter of size. How much difference does that make? The populations of European countries,
particularly those like Denmark, are relatively small and so are distances within and among them. Size of
expectations are also likely smaller than in the United States and there is also the matter of homogeneity - or
was. Less contentiousness among groups with fewer major differences is significant, and without major
differences in policy driven by international responsibilities there is likely less to argue about. Or so it would
seem. There really are advantages to cultural homogeneity. That is changing in Europe, however, with the
massive immigration of Muslims from all over the world, particularly significant when one views the decreased
propagation rates of traditional Europeans. Not that that has any application to the United States, because our
diversity is fact and increasing and there is no possibility that will ever change.
I would suggest that there are some inherent problems with comparing European countries with the United
States - it's kind of like apples and oranges. But how much of our discontent (exhibited so forcefully by East
Coast intellectuals) is related to our desire to be more European? And why is this? The grass does always
appear greener on the other side of the fence, but sometimes is it? One should not automatically write off that
thinking with a close out argument. But think of how most Americans view Europe's green grass - as tourists.
Do we see only what we want to see, and overlook that which is not shoved in our faces? Comparison of the
tourist kind lacks the detail necessary to understand fully, and thus must remain inconclusive.
On the other hand there are definitely things we could learn from Europe, if we could, and we would. But many of
them are cultural, cultures are set deep, and our understandings of each others' are necessarily superficial at
best - even if we were more interested in developing them.
A final thought on the subject has to do with immigration - to the United States, emigration from Europe, but
other places as well. There continues to be very strong demand for it; why? The main reason is opportunity, or
perception of it. For those who are ambitious, the opportunity has always been greater in the United States.
Thomas Sowell wrote that 1% of those who can emigrate do, and those tend to be the most ambitious and most
adventuresome, which is, he suggested, part of what has built our unique personality. Is that good or bad? It
depends on the outlook, and might explain why Americans are as driven as they are; and perhaps also our
envious nature? But it also might explain the relative lack of it in other nations.
One cannot help but wonder about our apparent desire to change our culture, when cultures don't change easily.
But then perhaps immigration is influencing that too. Are our immigrants beginning to want to bring their
cultures with them to supplant ours rather than share ours? And in some cases could that be because of their
disappointment with the opportunity they assumed they would find and didn't? Or perhaps it has to do with the
longing for some of the paternal care they remember and miss from their previous homelands. And what will
they think when American culture changes to what they left? It could even be that changing American culture to
something like what they left behind could leave them with the worst of both worlds. We cannot know
beforehand, and afterwards it is too late.
Government Control of the Economy
The great challenge to converting a market economy to a
controlled economy is the different motives of markets and
governments. Market priorities are about profit; government
priorities are about power.
Market decisions are self serving, but made by many, many layers
of self-serving. Government decisions are also self-serving, but for
a much smaller and focused (elite) sector of the population.
Market decisions are diluted by competitive self-serving, and thus
tend to be self-correcting; elite self-serving is elitism.
What happens when players in the market get too large and
competition dries up? That is the pitfall of free market capitalism: it
is theoretically possible for winner to take all, and is why free
markets accept and embrace regulation. So what happens when
governments replace competition? The efficiencies of the free
market that determine profit are replaced by the motives of
politicians, which is primarily to remain in power.
This explains the evolution of free markets; they are no longer pure
capitalism, but a mixture of capitalist motivation and government
control. We have seen the result of unrestrained capitalism, and
rejected it; there are many historical examples of unrestrained
government control, and many have painfully learned its
shortcomings. To be preferred is a balance of the two, but such
balance is precarious - and difficult; the pendulum swings are
continually dampened - else they get out of control.
I accept government regulation as a necessary constraint; I accept
free market self-interest as a necessary incentive. I am suspicious
of the greed and ego that drive both: God give us balance! For left
to our own devices we are unlikely to achieve it by ourselves. But
then that is what democratic free markets attempt to achieve, and
they do, better than the alternatives: balance, not as a steady state
condition but as an illusive goal approximated through controlled
competition.
The great challenge to converting a market economy to a
controlled economy is the different motives of markets and
governments. Market priorities are about profit; government
priorities are about power.
Market decisions are self serving, but made by many, many layers
of self-serving. Government decisions are also self-serving, but for
a much smaller and focused (elite) sector of the population.
Market decisions are diluted by competitive self-serving, and thus
tend to be self-correcting; elite self-serving is elitism.
What happens when players in the market get too large and
competition dries up? That is the pitfall of free market capitalism: it
is theoretically possible for winner to take all, and is why free
markets accept and embrace regulation. So what happens when
governments replace competition? The efficiencies of the free
market that determine profit are replaced by the motives of
politicians, which is primarily to remain in power.
This explains the evolution of free markets; they are no longer pure
capitalism, but a mixture of capitalist motivation and government
control. We have seen the result of unrestrained capitalism, and
rejected it; there are many historical examples of unrestrained
government control, and many have painfully learned its
shortcomings. To be preferred is a balance of the two, but such
balance is precarious - and difficult; the pendulum swings are
continually dampened - else they get out of control.
I accept government regulation as a necessary constraint; I accept
free market self-interest as a necessary incentive. I am suspicious
of the greed and ego that drive both: God give us balance! For left
to our own devices we are unlikely to achieve it by ourselves. But
then that is what democratic free markets attempt to achieve, and
they do, better than the alternatives: balance, not as a steady state
condition but as an illusive goal approximated through controlled
competition.
The Ultimate Balancing Act
We are all in favor of what is best for all, in theory: achieving it is
something that eludes us, because we really don't know what it
is or how to achieve it, since when each person decides for
himself what's best, it's a sliding scale, - changing constantly.
Which is why paternalism is popular with elites - the
paternalists decide what's good for everyone.
Agree with that or not, and many seem to, more or less and up
the point where they don't get what they want, there is still a
problem, and that is that in order to keep people happy with
what they get they run up against resource limits: there just don't
seem to be enough resources to provide everyone what he or
she wants.
Thus the ultimate balancing act: balancing available resources
with wants. Simple? Not by a long shot, and this is the
cruncher. On the one side the more is available the more is
wanted; on the other side the more made available the less
energy people are willing to expend to provide it. Stated
differently there is supply and there is demand and to meet
demand there must be supply. But why work to meet demand if
supply is infinite? Only it isn't. There must be incentive to
supply an inexorable demand or there won't be supply. The
Soviet Union discovered that quickly and painfully.
It is also the downfall of government controlled markets,
because government is not driven by free market principles and
their decisions are shaped by reasons that do not lead to the
most efficient use of resources. They see the best for all as
continued full employment and, as is the case with
governments today, reducing inefficient or unneeded workers
becomes difficult and counterproductive - to government's
objectives. More and more people produce less and less
product because there is no profit motive to incentivize them to
do otherwise.
Thus what in governmentese seems the best for all turns out to
be otherwise - they have jobs and demand but less and less
supply, and nothing can be done about it: Economics 101. But
the rank and file of our society do not understand Economics
101 although they do understand self-interest. Balance again.
So how is it achieved? I said we don't know how to achieve it -
and we don't, but if we leave it alone, with self-serving
incentives, and at least moderate regulation, it can approximate
a solution; not a permanent solution, but one than works
reasonably most of the time - for most people - better than
alternatives.
I think I am becoming redundant, but standing back it seems
so obvious: the committee of bureaucrats that is government
are neither qualified nor capable of dealing with the volume of
decisions and interactions. It is the same reason government
suffers from so much unintended circumstance; it is incapable
of dealing with the profusion and intricacy of the requirements.
No matter where I begin I end at the same point. But nothing
seems to change; the arrogance and narcissism of those who
choose to lead from government positions are above such
mundane reality. One lawmaker was once told that what he
was demanding was technically impossible at that time; if i
order it, he said, they will figure out some way to do it.
Which brings us back to the ultimate balancing act. It can never
be achieved perfectly, but it is achieved better when farmed out
than when pulled together centrally. Government has the
responsibility to moderate, but not to dictate; unfortunately even
its moderation often slides and stumbles toward dictating, and
when things turn rocky due to over dictation, what is done?
More dictating.
May the powers save us from government narcissism. But
don't hold your breath waiting for that to happen.
We are all in favor of what is best for all, in theory: achieving it is
something that eludes us, because we really don't know what it
is or how to achieve it, since when each person decides for
himself what's best, it's a sliding scale, - changing constantly.
Which is why paternalism is popular with elites - the
paternalists decide what's good for everyone.
Agree with that or not, and many seem to, more or less and up
the point where they don't get what they want, there is still a
problem, and that is that in order to keep people happy with
what they get they run up against resource limits: there just don't
seem to be enough resources to provide everyone what he or
she wants.
Thus the ultimate balancing act: balancing available resources
with wants. Simple? Not by a long shot, and this is the
cruncher. On the one side the more is available the more is
wanted; on the other side the more made available the less
energy people are willing to expend to provide it. Stated
differently there is supply and there is demand and to meet
demand there must be supply. But why work to meet demand if
supply is infinite? Only it isn't. There must be incentive to
supply an inexorable demand or there won't be supply. The
Soviet Union discovered that quickly and painfully.
It is also the downfall of government controlled markets,
because government is not driven by free market principles and
their decisions are shaped by reasons that do not lead to the
most efficient use of resources. They see the best for all as
continued full employment and, as is the case with
governments today, reducing inefficient or unneeded workers
becomes difficult and counterproductive - to government's
objectives. More and more people produce less and less
product because there is no profit motive to incentivize them to
do otherwise.
Thus what in governmentese seems the best for all turns out to
be otherwise - they have jobs and demand but less and less
supply, and nothing can be done about it: Economics 101. But
the rank and file of our society do not understand Economics
101 although they do understand self-interest. Balance again.
So how is it achieved? I said we don't know how to achieve it -
and we don't, but if we leave it alone, with self-serving
incentives, and at least moderate regulation, it can approximate
a solution; not a permanent solution, but one than works
reasonably most of the time - for most people - better than
alternatives.
I think I am becoming redundant, but standing back it seems
so obvious: the committee of bureaucrats that is government
are neither qualified nor capable of dealing with the volume of
decisions and interactions. It is the same reason government
suffers from so much unintended circumstance; it is incapable
of dealing with the profusion and intricacy of the requirements.
No matter where I begin I end at the same point. But nothing
seems to change; the arrogance and narcissism of those who
choose to lead from government positions are above such
mundane reality. One lawmaker was once told that what he
was demanding was technically impossible at that time; if i
order it, he said, they will figure out some way to do it.
Which brings us back to the ultimate balancing act. It can never
be achieved perfectly, but it is achieved better when farmed out
than when pulled together centrally. Government has the
responsibility to moderate, but not to dictate; unfortunately even
its moderation often slides and stumbles toward dictating, and
when things turn rocky due to over dictation, what is done?
More dictating.
May the powers save us from government narcissism. But
don't hold your breath waiting for that to happen.
Leadership Decisions and Voting
We have always prided ourselves in being a meritocracy, but in
most cases we do not know how to define merit because, in this
complicated world we do not understand requirements -
qualifications. This is true of large organization leadership, the
qualifications for which are total mystery. But it is also true in
elective government. What are the qualifications for an elected
official?
Today it seems that the most important is name recognition; next
comes good looks and smooth delivery; what else? Likability?
Confidence, oh my, we can't forget confidence. Intelligence? Not
necessarily. Honesty? Ha! Competence? How on earth could
we assess competence? - it is what the candidates tell us, and
we know what that is.
So who are our leaders? More and more it seems they are
smooth (and fast) talking manipulators that are good at selling us
snake oil, about which they know very little. As I have said more
than once, electing officials to our government becomes more
and more like voting for American Idol every day - feel good. And
what makes us feel good? We don't know, but we'll know it when
we see it. We are after all ruled more and more by emotion,
perhaps because our ability to weigh alternatives and make value
assessments - problem solving - is slowly (or not so slowly)
dissolving along with television viewership and standard tests.
And we get what we deserve.
Oh, and let's not overlook this: they know politics, and quickly
learn all about power and how to gain and hold on to it.
We have always prided ourselves in being a meritocracy, but in
most cases we do not know how to define merit because, in this
complicated world we do not understand requirements -
qualifications. This is true of large organization leadership, the
qualifications for which are total mystery. But it is also true in
elective government. What are the qualifications for an elected
official?
Today it seems that the most important is name recognition; next
comes good looks and smooth delivery; what else? Likability?
Confidence, oh my, we can't forget confidence. Intelligence? Not
necessarily. Honesty? Ha! Competence? How on earth could
we assess competence? - it is what the candidates tell us, and
we know what that is.
So who are our leaders? More and more it seems they are
smooth (and fast) talking manipulators that are good at selling us
snake oil, about which they know very little. As I have said more
than once, electing officials to our government becomes more
and more like voting for American Idol every day - feel good. And
what makes us feel good? We don't know, but we'll know it when
we see it. We are after all ruled more and more by emotion,
perhaps because our ability to weigh alternatives and make value
assessments - problem solving - is slowly (or not so slowly)
dissolving along with television viewership and standard tests.
And we get what we deserve.
Oh, and let's not overlook this: they know politics, and quickly
learn all about power and how to gain and hold on to it.
A Different Kind of World?
A strain that continues to reoccur during my reading and thinking is that of tribalism and anarchy. One can accept that anarchy
is a power vacuum, but must on the other hand also realize that it keeps rearing its ugly head - as tribalism, in its many forms.
Gellner stressed the essential role of the nation state structure in the creation and maintenance of modernity, but what if nation
states collapse, as they have in the past, into warring pockets of cultural differences? What then? The short run and the long run
are surely different. But then I was told by an acquaintance the other day that this country could not stay together heading in the
direction is was heading, reminding me of the succession coverage recently given to comments by the Texas governor. Both
were exaggerated and were emotional exploitations, but the fragmentation of homogeneity of thought and position is instructive.
Something that returns to my mind often is the unreliability of "the people" - that paragon of wisdom that is so often cited. The
people are not a paragon of wisdom, and history has made clear that they can be emotionally volatile; they can also be violent,
ignorant, prejudicial and possessive of tunnel vision, particularly when prodded by clever propaganda. Is this still the case? I
believe it is, with one caveat: volatility is reduced greatly when the potentially volatile have something to lose, and Americans
today have a great deal to lose, and worry about it. That is one argument against those who are asking, is house ownership still
important in the United States today? It is, for the stability it provides if nothing else.
But I still doubt the reliability of the people. I'll further that caveat by saying that a strong middle class also provides important
foundation. Besides, as Professor Caplan pointed out, the voting extremes of the population bounce around in a way that they
usually cancel each other out, leaving the field to the informed middle class. On the other hand Gellner made a point that sticks
in my mind as well: democracy thrives in continual improvement; it does less well in decline. Put all that together and there is at
least a modicum of question. That came to mind forcefully when I started thinking about the writings of Alice Ekert-Rotholz about
the early twentieth century time of troubles in China. "Political earthquakes," she wrote, "have happened so frequently in our time
that they really ought to surprise no one any longer. Nevertheless, countless numbers of our contemporaries are always
unprepared when the earth cracks and swallows them up with kith and kin, bank accounts and stamp collections." We have
always been a resilient people, but we have become spoiled. I cannot help but wonder how we would handle a catastrophe
where crying for government aid will avail us of nothing. Or consider another Rotholz' offerings:
that's not the point. They merely survived, but they knew how to survive chaos. I question whether we are, at least initially.
The subject of paternalism again; we have been conditioned to wait for the government to rush in and take care of us; we expect
it. Look at New Orleans after Katrina. Then on the other hand look at response to the 2008 flooding in the Midwest. Which
model will be ascendant? I suggest in rural regions the Midwest model will control; in urban regions the other. Fifty percent of
the population of the world now lives in cities; survival in cities requires the infrastructure of the city. So are we headed in the
direction of more paternalistic government? The 2008 election would suggest we are; so would the urbanization that will only
increase. In urban areas a short 200 years ago chaos and anarchy were quick to rise; have we moved beyond that? Perhaps we
have, through having much to lose, and perhaps we have not, Watts being an example; Watts chaos was subdued because
legal infrastructure remained strong. What would ensue if such infrastructure were neutralized? I think there is little doubt - we
have not progressed that far in two hundred years.
So what does this have to do with the matters under discussion? Perhaps nothing. But I somehow feel a volatility that seems
to be growing, and may only be held in place by our legal infrastructure - which of course it what it is there for. Max Weber: " the
state is that agency within society which possesses the monopoly on legitimate violence." What of illegitimate violence when the
monopoly is broken and envy and resentment erupt uncontrolled, Watts style? All right, that is the extreme, but how will we react
to "spreading the wealth" if the result is, as I would expect it to be, inflation and a drop off in prosperity and growth of joblessness
and poverty - in our matrix of expectation? And how will we react if the relative tranquility for us overseas is disrupted, particularly
if it leads to disruption of global commerce, upon which we so heavily rely? The world has changed since 2008, and is
beginning to return to normal; but can that trend continue in light of the "changes" that are so rapidly being pressed upon us?
Kaplan: "the real message here is not the failure of democracy - but the emergence of quasi-democratic 'hybrid' regimes, where
parliamentary practices are officially adhered to, while behind the scenes the military and security services play dominant roles.
Venezuela seems to be the latest example of this trend." He continues elsewhere, quoting Martin van Crevald (Transformation of
War), "once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrestled out of its hands, existing distinctions
between war and crime will break down much as is already the case in...Lebanon Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru or Columbia." Or
Somalia, or Mexico? How will our soft diplomacy and projected reduced military capacity deal with this, particularly if the fear of
American power is diminished?
A strain that continues to reoccur during my reading and thinking is that of tribalism and anarchy. One can accept that anarchy
is a power vacuum, but must on the other hand also realize that it keeps rearing its ugly head - as tribalism, in its many forms.
Gellner stressed the essential role of the nation state structure in the creation and maintenance of modernity, but what if nation
states collapse, as they have in the past, into warring pockets of cultural differences? What then? The short run and the long run
are surely different. But then I was told by an acquaintance the other day that this country could not stay together heading in the
direction is was heading, reminding me of the succession coverage recently given to comments by the Texas governor. Both
were exaggerated and were emotional exploitations, but the fragmentation of homogeneity of thought and position is instructive.
Something that returns to my mind often is the unreliability of "the people" - that paragon of wisdom that is so often cited. The
people are not a paragon of wisdom, and history has made clear that they can be emotionally volatile; they can also be violent,
ignorant, prejudicial and possessive of tunnel vision, particularly when prodded by clever propaganda. Is this still the case? I
believe it is, with one caveat: volatility is reduced greatly when the potentially volatile have something to lose, and Americans
today have a great deal to lose, and worry about it. That is one argument against those who are asking, is house ownership still
important in the United States today? It is, for the stability it provides if nothing else.
But I still doubt the reliability of the people. I'll further that caveat by saying that a strong middle class also provides important
foundation. Besides, as Professor Caplan pointed out, the voting extremes of the population bounce around in a way that they
usually cancel each other out, leaving the field to the informed middle class. On the other hand Gellner made a point that sticks
in my mind as well: democracy thrives in continual improvement; it does less well in decline. Put all that together and there is at
least a modicum of question. That came to mind forcefully when I started thinking about the writings of Alice Ekert-Rotholz about
the early twentieth century time of troubles in China. "Political earthquakes," she wrote, "have happened so frequently in our time
that they really ought to surprise no one any longer. Nevertheless, countless numbers of our contemporaries are always
unprepared when the earth cracks and swallows them up with kith and kin, bank accounts and stamp collections." We have
always been a resilient people, but we have become spoiled. I cannot help but wonder how we would handle a catastrophe
where crying for government aid will avail us of nothing. Or consider another Rotholz' offerings:
- "The fish that jumps into the frying pan is done for, but for the present Elder Sister stood in the burned out luxury
shop and was alive. That was all there was to it. It was very simple, and yet to the wounded and moaning
Europeans on the avenue it was utterly incomprehensible. 'The beasts!' a foreign woman whose car would go no
farther muttered to her husband. He shrugged his blood-smeared shoulders. "Chinese!" he said, feeling that he
had said everything necessary."
that's not the point. They merely survived, but they knew how to survive chaos. I question whether we are, at least initially.
The subject of paternalism again; we have been conditioned to wait for the government to rush in and take care of us; we expect
it. Look at New Orleans after Katrina. Then on the other hand look at response to the 2008 flooding in the Midwest. Which
model will be ascendant? I suggest in rural regions the Midwest model will control; in urban regions the other. Fifty percent of
the population of the world now lives in cities; survival in cities requires the infrastructure of the city. So are we headed in the
direction of more paternalistic government? The 2008 election would suggest we are; so would the urbanization that will only
increase. In urban areas a short 200 years ago chaos and anarchy were quick to rise; have we moved beyond that? Perhaps we
have, through having much to lose, and perhaps we have not, Watts being an example; Watts chaos was subdued because
legal infrastructure remained strong. What would ensue if such infrastructure were neutralized? I think there is little doubt - we
have not progressed that far in two hundred years.
So what does this have to do with the matters under discussion? Perhaps nothing. But I somehow feel a volatility that seems
to be growing, and may only be held in place by our legal infrastructure - which of course it what it is there for. Max Weber: " the
state is that agency within society which possesses the monopoly on legitimate violence." What of illegitimate violence when the
monopoly is broken and envy and resentment erupt uncontrolled, Watts style? All right, that is the extreme, but how will we react
to "spreading the wealth" if the result is, as I would expect it to be, inflation and a drop off in prosperity and growth of joblessness
and poverty - in our matrix of expectation? And how will we react if the relative tranquility for us overseas is disrupted, particularly
if it leads to disruption of global commerce, upon which we so heavily rely? The world has changed since 2008, and is
beginning to return to normal; but can that trend continue in light of the "changes" that are so rapidly being pressed upon us?
Kaplan: "the real message here is not the failure of democracy - but the emergence of quasi-democratic 'hybrid' regimes, where
parliamentary practices are officially adhered to, while behind the scenes the military and security services play dominant roles.
Venezuela seems to be the latest example of this trend." He continues elsewhere, quoting Martin van Crevald (Transformation of
War), "once the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is wrestled out of its hands, existing distinctions
between war and crime will break down much as is already the case in...Lebanon Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru or Columbia." Or
Somalia, or Mexico? How will our soft diplomacy and projected reduced military capacity deal with this, particularly if the fear of
American power is diminished?
Wither Democratic Republicanism?
There are unmistakable patterns developing; one is that about 50% of the world’s population
now lives in urban areas. What does that have to do with democratic republicanism? Rural
populations, at least agrarian rural populations have a fallback position that urban populations
lack – the land. Urban population doesn’t raise anything, needs jobs, has to commute for the
most part, and is otherwise dependent upon the city lifestyle, which often excludes the flexibility
of extended families. Another pattern seems to be the growing gap between the “rich” and the
“poor”. I contend that is misleading; I would prefer to describe it as a difference between the life
styles of the educated/skilled and the undereducated/unskilled. I used to want to throw in
difference in motivation, but in the age of outsized expectation I’m not sure how that plays any
more. Additionally, the pattern of the emergence of power politics driven by ubiquitous digital
propaganda and entertainment worship play an increasingly important role.
The importance of the changing patterns from a political point of view is, perhaps to
oversimplify, willingness to depend upon government rather than to want to rely on individual
independence, partly due to the high cost of an urban life-style. Housing, services,
transportation, taxes, health care and retirement all contribute mightily to greater economic
burden upon urban populations, and thus related stress and worry. In short, economic security
is more important to most than opportunity, partly because the more poorly educated and
skilled don’t see that they have that much opportunity anyway. Part of that is that they didn’t avail
themselves to learn it when they could, part of it lays with immigrant populations that are not
used to the challenges, and part is an increasing rise in expectation. All point in one direction:
greater willingness to look to the government for support; it’s been going on at least since the
Wilson administration, with a few, but very short detours.
In some places in the world that is evidencing itself as socialism; but that’s too harsh for the
United States where populism is probably a more appropriate word; the U.S. has always had a
strong tendency toward populism. But it’s more than that; social awareness perhaps?
Probably it is the logical extension of classical liberalism and Christianity leading to acceptance
of rights of individuals and responsibility of societies, leading to a more egalitarian outlook,
which is highly exploitable. And that, I would argue, is where Western democratic
republicanism stands at this moment, in that we feel very strongly that it is our responsibility to
spread the advantages we enjoy both internally and externally to all the rest of the world,
whether they are ready for it or not – all being exploited.
Democratic republicanism, however, is dependent upon modernity and modernity is
dependent upon education and acceptance – embrace, actually – of respect for law, willingness
to compromise and individual responsibility which is seen to yield opportunity. So as more and
more people see opportunity as illusive and economic/social security more enticing, what is the
future of democratic republicanism? We have tasted Dr. Huntington’s cultural fault line friction;
George Friedman points to geopolitical disruption; Zacharia, Goldberg, Fukuyama and Murray
talk of less earth shattering, but equally important adjustments; Kaplan predicts a more
fundamental breakdown; but all suggest that changes are inevitable; the recent global financial
fiasco suggests they are also likely to be painful.
Underlying all this are realities that are not admitted by all: people are not equal and there will
be differences based on many factors including ability, motivation, and opportunity; there are as
many viewpoints as there are individuals; and human nature is such that people will pursue
different approaches, some cooperative, some disruptive and some predatory. No amount of
wishing will change this and therefore a government based on democratic republicanism is
necessarily contentious and becoming more so, with electronic communication making such
monumental gains. I remember when Time magazine featured a short article on how much the
transistor radio had changed the lives of dessert nomads who suddenly were viewing the world
in a different light. Then there was television – and the computer; now everyone is exposed to
everything everyone else is doing and enjoying, but they understand it little enough and find fault
with it greatly when it is not in accordance with their own beliefs, wants and expectations.
Most obviously, and probably simplistically, there is that yawning gap between haves and have-
nots being exploited as it always has: envy rules as it always has. But within a modern
republican environment the differences are being afforded far greater opportunity for expression
than ever before – while being exploited. The result is a clash between desire for security and
desire for opportunity – we want it all. The natural extremes, tyranny and anarchy, each lead to
pain and suffering and must be damped by reason and respect, two ingredients that appear in
shorter and shorter supply, as greater and greater complexity clashes with less and less
understanding of it.
Karl Marx was one of the earliest to write about it, developing the term class warfare. Marx’s
suggested solutions didn’t work, but that hasn’t stopped people from dreaming of some
manifestation of them. What with the natural appetites of man, they are not likely to go away, as
the practitioners of democratic republicanism find new ways to exploit them. So wither
democratic republicanism? The same patterns seem to be developing everywhere, albeit with
innumerable nuances: pit have-nots against haves, exaggerate everything, spread lies and
innuendo to attack those with different views, promise what cannot be delivered, and pursue
power to its fullest. Not much new there; the struggle for power between those who have it and
those that want it, or at least the fruits of it, has always been a fact of life, and now it has reached
its full potential in republicanism, which presupposes forced cooperation based on rule of law,
yet opens opportunity to any and all comers that can wow the voters with the extremes being
mined for their difference-potential, despite that both are unacceptable in fruition. But the
ignorant, short-sighted and complacent don’t realize it until it is too late.
“A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters
discover that they can vote themselves largess from the public treasury. From that time on the
majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury,
with the results that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy, always followed by a
dictatorship. The average age of the world's great civilizations has been 200 years. These
nations have progressed through this sequence:
Tytler (1742-1813), Scottish jurist and historian, professor of Universal History at Edinburgh
University. Where is anarchy? Perhaps somewhere between selfishness, complacency and
apathy. And where is fascism? Between dependency and bondage. What difference in a
globally interconnected world? It will certainly be a chaotic process, as it evolves everywhere;
but when evolving simultaneously in many places will be more chaotic yet.
There are unmistakable patterns developing; one is that about 50% of the world’s population
now lives in urban areas. What does that have to do with democratic republicanism? Rural
populations, at least agrarian rural populations have a fallback position that urban populations
lack – the land. Urban population doesn’t raise anything, needs jobs, has to commute for the
most part, and is otherwise dependent upon the city lifestyle, which often excludes the flexibility
of extended families. Another pattern seems to be the growing gap between the “rich” and the
“poor”. I contend that is misleading; I would prefer to describe it as a difference between the life
styles of the educated/skilled and the undereducated/unskilled. I used to want to throw in
difference in motivation, but in the age of outsized expectation I’m not sure how that plays any
more. Additionally, the pattern of the emergence of power politics driven by ubiquitous digital
propaganda and entertainment worship play an increasingly important role.
The importance of the changing patterns from a political point of view is, perhaps to
oversimplify, willingness to depend upon government rather than to want to rely on individual
independence, partly due to the high cost of an urban life-style. Housing, services,
transportation, taxes, health care and retirement all contribute mightily to greater economic
burden upon urban populations, and thus related stress and worry. In short, economic security
is more important to most than opportunity, partly because the more poorly educated and
skilled don’t see that they have that much opportunity anyway. Part of that is that they didn’t avail
themselves to learn it when they could, part of it lays with immigrant populations that are not
used to the challenges, and part is an increasing rise in expectation. All point in one direction:
greater willingness to look to the government for support; it’s been going on at least since the
Wilson administration, with a few, but very short detours.
In some places in the world that is evidencing itself as socialism; but that’s too harsh for the
United States where populism is probably a more appropriate word; the U.S. has always had a
strong tendency toward populism. But it’s more than that; social awareness perhaps?
Probably it is the logical extension of classical liberalism and Christianity leading to acceptance
of rights of individuals and responsibility of societies, leading to a more egalitarian outlook,
which is highly exploitable. And that, I would argue, is where Western democratic
republicanism stands at this moment, in that we feel very strongly that it is our responsibility to
spread the advantages we enjoy both internally and externally to all the rest of the world,
whether they are ready for it or not – all being exploited.
Democratic republicanism, however, is dependent upon modernity and modernity is
dependent upon education and acceptance – embrace, actually – of respect for law, willingness
to compromise and individual responsibility which is seen to yield opportunity. So as more and
more people see opportunity as illusive and economic/social security more enticing, what is the
future of democratic republicanism? We have tasted Dr. Huntington’s cultural fault line friction;
George Friedman points to geopolitical disruption; Zacharia, Goldberg, Fukuyama and Murray
talk of less earth shattering, but equally important adjustments; Kaplan predicts a more
fundamental breakdown; but all suggest that changes are inevitable; the recent global financial
fiasco suggests they are also likely to be painful.
Underlying all this are realities that are not admitted by all: people are not equal and there will
be differences based on many factors including ability, motivation, and opportunity; there are as
many viewpoints as there are individuals; and human nature is such that people will pursue
different approaches, some cooperative, some disruptive and some predatory. No amount of
wishing will change this and therefore a government based on democratic republicanism is
necessarily contentious and becoming more so, with electronic communication making such
monumental gains. I remember when Time magazine featured a short article on how much the
transistor radio had changed the lives of dessert nomads who suddenly were viewing the world
in a different light. Then there was television – and the computer; now everyone is exposed to
everything everyone else is doing and enjoying, but they understand it little enough and find fault
with it greatly when it is not in accordance with their own beliefs, wants and expectations.
Most obviously, and probably simplistically, there is that yawning gap between haves and have-
nots being exploited as it always has: envy rules as it always has. But within a modern
republican environment the differences are being afforded far greater opportunity for expression
than ever before – while being exploited. The result is a clash between desire for security and
desire for opportunity – we want it all. The natural extremes, tyranny and anarchy, each lead to
pain and suffering and must be damped by reason and respect, two ingredients that appear in
shorter and shorter supply, as greater and greater complexity clashes with less and less
understanding of it.
Karl Marx was one of the earliest to write about it, developing the term class warfare. Marx’s
suggested solutions didn’t work, but that hasn’t stopped people from dreaming of some
manifestation of them. What with the natural appetites of man, they are not likely to go away, as
the practitioners of democratic republicanism find new ways to exploit them. So wither
democratic republicanism? The same patterns seem to be developing everywhere, albeit with
innumerable nuances: pit have-nots against haves, exaggerate everything, spread lies and
innuendo to attack those with different views, promise what cannot be delivered, and pursue
power to its fullest. Not much new there; the struggle for power between those who have it and
those that want it, or at least the fruits of it, has always been a fact of life, and now it has reached
its full potential in republicanism, which presupposes forced cooperation based on rule of law,
yet opens opportunity to any and all comers that can wow the voters with the extremes being
mined for their difference-potential, despite that both are unacceptable in fruition. But the
ignorant, short-sighted and complacent don’t realize it until it is too late.
“A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters
discover that they can vote themselves largess from the public treasury. From that time on the
majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury,
with the results that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy, always followed by a
dictatorship. The average age of the world's great civilizations has been 200 years. These
nations have progressed through this sequence:
- from bondage to spiritual faith;
from spiritual faith to great courage;
from courage to liberty;
from liberty to abundance;
from abundance to selfishness;
from selfishness to complacency;
from complacency to apathy;
from apathy to dependency;
from dependency back again to bondage."
Tytler (1742-1813), Scottish jurist and historian, professor of Universal History at Edinburgh
University. Where is anarchy? Perhaps somewhere between selfishness, complacency and
apathy. And where is fascism? Between dependency and bondage. What difference in a
globally interconnected world? It will certainly be a chaotic process, as it evolves everywhere;
but when evolving simultaneously in many places will be more chaotic yet.