Power and Greed
Power is the objective and greed is the catalyst, when one accepts that power and greed are words
that attempt to explain rather more complicated emotions. But accepting the simplicity of generality I find
them convenient in creating a comfortable model of historic development that helps explain – at least for
me – the cycles through which governing seems to go, both long and short cycles.
I have played with portions of such a model before, but am returning because of recent thinking done
related to oligarchy – another simple word with multiple layers of meaning, but simplistically identifying
rule of few over the many. Not that there is any great insight involved in my ruminations; many, including
professor Tytler, have discussed the process if not the historical cycularity. The first known power
structures were family and clan where motive was first security and then tradition. Family tradition
developed around male paternalism and merely expanded in the clan structure with power to the
strongest patron, with transition occurring when that patron was no longer capable of fulfilling his
leadership – power – obligations. Using the words greed and oligarchy in this context are probably a
stretch, but a convenient one, greed translating to desire to control (after being invested in the
responsibility to do so) and oligarchy assuming that no one really exercises power all by himself, but
seeks advice from others. In the earliest sense that meant those being led also advised.
Then agriculture was “discovered” and apparently the paternal leadership tradition continued. But
agriculture created wealth and wherever there is wealth there are thugs lurking to get a piece of it, and
some sort of defense had to be set up, and someone had to lead it: the beginning of oligarchy - the few
(he couldn’t do it alone) with power over the many. Why power? Because they who controlled the
weapons and the soldiers that knew how to use them, had the power. Fast forward to the break-up of the
Roman Empire and the power structure changed some, but the basis was the same: security. The few
still had the troops and the weapons, which came with the wealth of land, and the rest surrendered to
them to save their skins. So it went throughout the Middle Ages, at the end of which came trade and the
merchant class who came to have all the money; and kings needed money. Gradually (in some cases
suddenly) kings gave way to new kinds of governments: still kings, dictators and also republics; all
dominated by the power of money. The most famous oligarchies were those of Italian city states, small
groups of wealthy merchants who wielded all the power. Nor did kings any longer rule without a host of
advisors and tax collectors (but then neither did Roman emperors) – empire or oligarchy? Whichever
you prefer; it was rule of the many by the few.
So much for power, which has changed only in the details. The few had power initially because they
had the land wealth, the troops and the weapons and knew how to use them for protection. And why did
all those other folks flock to those whose power could protect them? Is greed too much of a stretch?
Those who needed protection wanted greedily to protect what they had, including their lives; but so did
the powerful land owners, including the kings and their men. From whom? From those who wanted to
take it away from them: more greed. Greed after all must be seen on a sliding scale and depends on the
eye of the beholder.
The relationship between power and greed is, he with power wants either to protect what he has, or
add to it, often by taking what someone else has: greed. Adding money wealth to the picture didn’t
change it much; power was still based on security and the oligarchy hired the troops and weapons to
provide it – from those who would take it away, but the nature of government changed because suddenly
there were new ways of stealing wealth, and governments were formed to protect the wealth from those
new ways, with laws and courts (and police), creating secure foundation for merchants to do their
business with protection from a new kind of thug, while the troops provided protection from the old kind
of thug.
Then there were revolutions. These came about because the oligarchs (of whatever ilk) flaunted
their wealth and took advantage of the power it gave them over others, which the others resented. Thus
developed the power of envy, something exploitable by those who wanted to share in what the oligarchs
had (or to take it from them). What is envy but greed? Latin America was a wonderful example of those
that had, exploiting those that didn’t, with revolutions, large and small, becoming fairly common, power
changing hands with some regularity, while changing little in character.
A new kind of oligarchy was born however in the process, using the power of envy to gain real power:
the republican politics of envy. Republican oligarchs were pretty much like their predecessors, but had
to court the have-nots to retain power, through elections, often doing so by using physical power to
subvert and coerce. But others began to figure out how to use the politics of envy (greed) to organize an
opposition that became strong enough to overthrow the oligarchs at the ballot boxes through charisma
and populism, promising voters, even though the promises almost never came to much because the new
oligarchs had the same greedy mind set as the old oligarchs (power) with no more resources. Well, that’
s not entirely fair, but it really didn’t matter much because the promises they had to make to the envious
were always beyond their power to deliver, and that inability laid the foundation for the next group of
potential oligarchs. What has always remained consistent is greed for power and envy greed for what
the powerful have and often flaunt.
This brings us more or less to the present, where most governments are republics of one kind or
another, that at least pretend to be representatives of the people who must vote them into office. Run by
Oligarchs (although the few have become more as government has expanded) they must either keep the
voters happy or maintain their power through force; and keeping them happy usually means giving them
whatever they want. That works pretty well during the good times, but less well when things turn bad.
Being greedy, voters don’t stand for giving back what they have won (bribes from the oligarchy) and are
quite ready to support whoever promises them whatever it is they want to hear; the fact that oligarchs-to-
be cannot deliver on those promises is usually beyond the understanding of “greedy” and gullible voters,
which sets up the next round of revolution, regardless of its means. Keep in mind that greed in this
context may be just maintaining what they have come to believe is their entitled level of survival.
So what has changed? Instead of just two players, haves and have-nots, and elite (who are the only
ones who generally are able to become part of an oligarchy) and the poor, there is something in between;
we call it middle class, but the middle between two extremes is not likely to be homogeneous, and
particularly since republics are never the same, neither is the class in the middle. This introduces a new
term: elite. Oligarchy is elite, but with a modern middle class, oligarchy and elite may be somewhat
different because ruling is different in that power has become both more diffused, but still
interconnected. The result is that oligarchy and elite have become far more amorphous than ever
because of the complex nature of “ruling”. Of course there have always been rival factions among the
elite lusting for oligarchy, but those are no longer so clearly identifiable in complex republics because
middle class entails many more pockets of power, that although not oligarchic, are critical to oligarchic
rule. These include businesses, unions, military, academia and media to name but a few. And the
structure through which republican oligarchies wield power have become so massive it would be difficult
to state at what point an oligarchy, or for that matter the elite, ends and the ruled begins. In the American
republic (and many others) there are many pockets of the oligarchy (executive, legislative, and judicial for
example; but also hierarchies of oligarchy such as federal and state, and even local). Is a city mayor part
of the oligarchy? Is a mid-level official in the executive branch of the federal government? Are they
among the elite? Captains of industry and college presidents probably would not be considered of the
oligarchy; but are they of the elite? How about vice presidents? College professors?
Here is where modern oligarchs and elites begin to depart significantly from the traditional
definitions of the past, merely because there is so much more to “ruling”. It is also the difference
between modern republican oligarchs and those of most developing countries, who remain much closer
to the traditional version than the modern version. What it comes down to is that the more there is to rule
the more difficult it is to do with “a few”, and the subsequent structure diffuses power widely; but then
even the definition of power takes on a new meaning because there are many kinds and levels of power
and instead of it being wielded it is more a matter of coordinating it. In the process oligarch and elite
assume clearer differences, with oligarch pertaining to high government officials and elite being the
matrix in which they swim. Still the meanings can be obscure. Is a senator part of the oligarchy? Is a
state senator? Is there a hierarchy of oligarchy? Elite is even more vague and indistinct. What are the
qualifications for elite?
This begins to explain the concern many have for what has become the modern republican oligarchy:
it has become too large for traditional definitions of government. It can even be argued that it has
become too large for coordinating the power that it attempts to wield. It is also why those with libertarian
bent oppose the direction it is taking; it cannot do either what it is charged to do or what it attempts to do,
and trips over itself in attempting to do it. I would suggest that most of the reason this is so has to do
with finance and economics. The transactions that must be generated for a nation to function, and the
financing necessary to support them and allow them to occur smoothly are beyond the capabilities of
“the few”. The framers of the U.S. Constitution foresaw this and attempted to head it off, but many of our
modern elite contend that the Constitution is an anachronism, no longer representing reality in governing
a modern nation.
So where does this leave us? Back at the subject of this essay: power and greed. Those that favor
diffused power, specifically limitations, argue that greed (self interest) must be allowed to operate in
such a way that its playing out will be counteractive; that is, that all the competing self-interests will react
competitively to balance in such a way as to yield the best overall results while rewarding individual
ability, effort and resourcefulness. Those that favor consolidated power would have an elite oligarchy
wielding the power to determine how things are done and who does them, in increasing detail, or as it
has been explained, centrally planned. In the first example competition rules and those that cannot
compete fail; in the second example the goal is a leveling process that attempts to approach a relative
equality – or spreading of the benefit of all resources, including individual effort. For many decades now
we have been moving toward the second example, generally because there are always going to be more
losers than winners, and majorities by and large will opt for that which provides them with the greater
security – with, in many cases, the least effort.
Thus we seem to be returning to the original Middle Ages model of more clearly defined oligarchic
elite and dependent security under an auspices of egalitarian spreading of the wealth. The difference, of
course, is only in how the elite oligarchy is identified, by popular vote instead of birth or wealth. But once
the elite oligarchy has been identified by popular vote it becomes the elite and we come full circle back to
power. If the oligarchic elite can wield that power to satisfy the needs – and wants – of the citizenry all
will be satisfied. If it cannot there will be dissatisfaction. History suggests that we are in the middle of
yet another cycle of power and greed.
Power is the objective and greed is the catalyst, when one accepts that power and greed are words
that attempt to explain rather more complicated emotions. But accepting the simplicity of generality I find
them convenient in creating a comfortable model of historic development that helps explain – at least for
me – the cycles through which governing seems to go, both long and short cycles.
I have played with portions of such a model before, but am returning because of recent thinking done
related to oligarchy – another simple word with multiple layers of meaning, but simplistically identifying
rule of few over the many. Not that there is any great insight involved in my ruminations; many, including
professor Tytler, have discussed the process if not the historical cycularity. The first known power
structures were family and clan where motive was first security and then tradition. Family tradition
developed around male paternalism and merely expanded in the clan structure with power to the
strongest patron, with transition occurring when that patron was no longer capable of fulfilling his
leadership – power – obligations. Using the words greed and oligarchy in this context are probably a
stretch, but a convenient one, greed translating to desire to control (after being invested in the
responsibility to do so) and oligarchy assuming that no one really exercises power all by himself, but
seeks advice from others. In the earliest sense that meant those being led also advised.
Then agriculture was “discovered” and apparently the paternal leadership tradition continued. But
agriculture created wealth and wherever there is wealth there are thugs lurking to get a piece of it, and
some sort of defense had to be set up, and someone had to lead it: the beginning of oligarchy - the few
(he couldn’t do it alone) with power over the many. Why power? Because they who controlled the
weapons and the soldiers that knew how to use them, had the power. Fast forward to the break-up of the
Roman Empire and the power structure changed some, but the basis was the same: security. The few
still had the troops and the weapons, which came with the wealth of land, and the rest surrendered to
them to save their skins. So it went throughout the Middle Ages, at the end of which came trade and the
merchant class who came to have all the money; and kings needed money. Gradually (in some cases
suddenly) kings gave way to new kinds of governments: still kings, dictators and also republics; all
dominated by the power of money. The most famous oligarchies were those of Italian city states, small
groups of wealthy merchants who wielded all the power. Nor did kings any longer rule without a host of
advisors and tax collectors (but then neither did Roman emperors) – empire or oligarchy? Whichever
you prefer; it was rule of the many by the few.
So much for power, which has changed only in the details. The few had power initially because they
had the land wealth, the troops and the weapons and knew how to use them for protection. And why did
all those other folks flock to those whose power could protect them? Is greed too much of a stretch?
Those who needed protection wanted greedily to protect what they had, including their lives; but so did
the powerful land owners, including the kings and their men. From whom? From those who wanted to
take it away from them: more greed. Greed after all must be seen on a sliding scale and depends on the
eye of the beholder.
The relationship between power and greed is, he with power wants either to protect what he has, or
add to it, often by taking what someone else has: greed. Adding money wealth to the picture didn’t
change it much; power was still based on security and the oligarchy hired the troops and weapons to
provide it – from those who would take it away, but the nature of government changed because suddenly
there were new ways of stealing wealth, and governments were formed to protect the wealth from those
new ways, with laws and courts (and police), creating secure foundation for merchants to do their
business with protection from a new kind of thug, while the troops provided protection from the old kind
of thug.
Then there were revolutions. These came about because the oligarchs (of whatever ilk) flaunted
their wealth and took advantage of the power it gave them over others, which the others resented. Thus
developed the power of envy, something exploitable by those who wanted to share in what the oligarchs
had (or to take it from them). What is envy but greed? Latin America was a wonderful example of those
that had, exploiting those that didn’t, with revolutions, large and small, becoming fairly common, power
changing hands with some regularity, while changing little in character.
A new kind of oligarchy was born however in the process, using the power of envy to gain real power:
the republican politics of envy. Republican oligarchs were pretty much like their predecessors, but had
to court the have-nots to retain power, through elections, often doing so by using physical power to
subvert and coerce. But others began to figure out how to use the politics of envy (greed) to organize an
opposition that became strong enough to overthrow the oligarchs at the ballot boxes through charisma
and populism, promising voters, even though the promises almost never came to much because the new
oligarchs had the same greedy mind set as the old oligarchs (power) with no more resources. Well, that’
s not entirely fair, but it really didn’t matter much because the promises they had to make to the envious
were always beyond their power to deliver, and that inability laid the foundation for the next group of
potential oligarchs. What has always remained consistent is greed for power and envy greed for what
the powerful have and often flaunt.
This brings us more or less to the present, where most governments are republics of one kind or
another, that at least pretend to be representatives of the people who must vote them into office. Run by
Oligarchs (although the few have become more as government has expanded) they must either keep the
voters happy or maintain their power through force; and keeping them happy usually means giving them
whatever they want. That works pretty well during the good times, but less well when things turn bad.
Being greedy, voters don’t stand for giving back what they have won (bribes from the oligarchy) and are
quite ready to support whoever promises them whatever it is they want to hear; the fact that oligarchs-to-
be cannot deliver on those promises is usually beyond the understanding of “greedy” and gullible voters,
which sets up the next round of revolution, regardless of its means. Keep in mind that greed in this
context may be just maintaining what they have come to believe is their entitled level of survival.
So what has changed? Instead of just two players, haves and have-nots, and elite (who are the only
ones who generally are able to become part of an oligarchy) and the poor, there is something in between;
we call it middle class, but the middle between two extremes is not likely to be homogeneous, and
particularly since republics are never the same, neither is the class in the middle. This introduces a new
term: elite. Oligarchy is elite, but with a modern middle class, oligarchy and elite may be somewhat
different because ruling is different in that power has become both more diffused, but still
interconnected. The result is that oligarchy and elite have become far more amorphous than ever
because of the complex nature of “ruling”. Of course there have always been rival factions among the
elite lusting for oligarchy, but those are no longer so clearly identifiable in complex republics because
middle class entails many more pockets of power, that although not oligarchic, are critical to oligarchic
rule. These include businesses, unions, military, academia and media to name but a few. And the
structure through which republican oligarchies wield power have become so massive it would be difficult
to state at what point an oligarchy, or for that matter the elite, ends and the ruled begins. In the American
republic (and many others) there are many pockets of the oligarchy (executive, legislative, and judicial for
example; but also hierarchies of oligarchy such as federal and state, and even local). Is a city mayor part
of the oligarchy? Is a mid-level official in the executive branch of the federal government? Are they
among the elite? Captains of industry and college presidents probably would not be considered of the
oligarchy; but are they of the elite? How about vice presidents? College professors?
Here is where modern oligarchs and elites begin to depart significantly from the traditional
definitions of the past, merely because there is so much more to “ruling”. It is also the difference
between modern republican oligarchs and those of most developing countries, who remain much closer
to the traditional version than the modern version. What it comes down to is that the more there is to rule
the more difficult it is to do with “a few”, and the subsequent structure diffuses power widely; but then
even the definition of power takes on a new meaning because there are many kinds and levels of power
and instead of it being wielded it is more a matter of coordinating it. In the process oligarch and elite
assume clearer differences, with oligarch pertaining to high government officials and elite being the
matrix in which they swim. Still the meanings can be obscure. Is a senator part of the oligarchy? Is a
state senator? Is there a hierarchy of oligarchy? Elite is even more vague and indistinct. What are the
qualifications for elite?
This begins to explain the concern many have for what has become the modern republican oligarchy:
it has become too large for traditional definitions of government. It can even be argued that it has
become too large for coordinating the power that it attempts to wield. It is also why those with libertarian
bent oppose the direction it is taking; it cannot do either what it is charged to do or what it attempts to do,
and trips over itself in attempting to do it. I would suggest that most of the reason this is so has to do
with finance and economics. The transactions that must be generated for a nation to function, and the
financing necessary to support them and allow them to occur smoothly are beyond the capabilities of
“the few”. The framers of the U.S. Constitution foresaw this and attempted to head it off, but many of our
modern elite contend that the Constitution is an anachronism, no longer representing reality in governing
a modern nation.
So where does this leave us? Back at the subject of this essay: power and greed. Those that favor
diffused power, specifically limitations, argue that greed (self interest) must be allowed to operate in
such a way that its playing out will be counteractive; that is, that all the competing self-interests will react
competitively to balance in such a way as to yield the best overall results while rewarding individual
ability, effort and resourcefulness. Those that favor consolidated power would have an elite oligarchy
wielding the power to determine how things are done and who does them, in increasing detail, or as it
has been explained, centrally planned. In the first example competition rules and those that cannot
compete fail; in the second example the goal is a leveling process that attempts to approach a relative
equality – or spreading of the benefit of all resources, including individual effort. For many decades now
we have been moving toward the second example, generally because there are always going to be more
losers than winners, and majorities by and large will opt for that which provides them with the greater
security – with, in many cases, the least effort.
Thus we seem to be returning to the original Middle Ages model of more clearly defined oligarchic
elite and dependent security under an auspices of egalitarian spreading of the wealth. The difference, of
course, is only in how the elite oligarchy is identified, by popular vote instead of birth or wealth. But once
the elite oligarchy has been identified by popular vote it becomes the elite and we come full circle back to
power. If the oligarchic elite can wield that power to satisfy the needs – and wants – of the citizenry all
will be satisfied. If it cannot there will be dissatisfaction. History suggests that we are in the middle of
yet another cycle of power and greed.
Power and Greed